China’s nuclear buildup is increasingly finding new space in remote inland mountainous regions that once formed the core of Mao Zedong’s Cold War defence strategy
As the world witnesses two ongoing direct wars (Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Iran-US), there is a secret movement happening in the mountains of southwest China, a region which hides the remnants of a once-secret industrial project. A part of Mao Zedong’s “Third Front”, which was a vast national defence programme launched in 1964 at the height of Cold War tensions, the region is witnessing growing state activity in recent months after decades of abandonment, according to a report by The New York Times (NYT).
As ties between Beijing and Washington deteriorate, China is once again emphasising strategic depth and self-reliance. Recent satellite imagery accessed by NYT in February this year indicates that parts of Sichuan, which is home to many former Third Front facilities, are seeing fresh activity linked to China’s nuclear programme.
The idea behind the Third Front programme was to move critical industry away from China’s vulnerable eastern coast and into remote inland regions such as Sichuan, Gansu and Ningxia. These areas, which are shielded by difficult natural terrain, were meant to serve as a secure fallback in case of invasion by the United States or the Soviet Union.
In July 2024, the Communist Party leadership passed a resolution calling for the development of a “strategic hinterland” and backup systems for key industries. The reference pointed to a renewed focus on inland provinces as buffers against potential conflict or economic disruption.
Why were Mao-era military facilities abandoned?
The scale of the Third Front programme was unprecedented, with around 15 million people mobilised and more than 200 billion yuan invested over roughly 15 years, according to a report by The Guardian. Entire factory complexes were built in mountainous zones, often in secrecy, forming what one visiting American scientist later described as an “inland nuclear empire”.
But the same logic that drove the Third Front began to fade after Mao’s death in 1976. Under Deng Xiaoping, China reassessed its threat perception and economic priorities.
In 1985, Deng publicly stated that the likelihood of large-scale war had diminished, and as relations with the United States improved, Beijing shifted focus towards economic development. Many inland factories, built far from supply chains and markets, were no longer viable.
Several facilities were either shut down or repurposed for civilian use. Over time, the regions around them changed as well as villages aged, younger populations moved out, and industrial activity declined.
What role do these sites play in China’s nuclear expansion today?
In the Zitong region, engineers have been constructing new bunkers and fortified structures, reported The Guardian. Another site, Pingtong, is to be used for the production of plutonium cores for nuclear warheads. The site has been upgraded with new ventilation equipment as well as new heat-dispersal facilities. Further construction is also underway, NYT said.
Meanwhile, China’s nuclear arsenal is growing in line with these developments. It is estimated that as of 2024, China has more than 600 warheads, and by 2030, the number is expected to grow to 1,000. Though these numbers are significantly lower than those of the US and Russia, their rate of increase has sparked concern in Washington.
US officials have also raised concerns about possible nuclear testing activity, allegations that Beijing has strongly denied.
How does this fit into China’s broader military strategy?
The revival of inland infrastructure coincides with a steady increase in defence spending and domestic capability.
According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, China’s military spending has risen from about one-sixth of US levels in 2012, the year Xi Jinping took office, to roughly one-third by 2024, reaching $317.6 billion.
At the same time, reliance on foreign arms has declined. Recent data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) shows China’s arms imports fell by more than 70 per cent between 2021 and 2025 compared to the previous five years.
What does this mean for global arms control efforts?
China’s nuclear buildup comes at a time when existing arms control frameworks are under strain. The last remaining nuclear treaty between the United States and Russia is nearing its end, and efforts to negotiate a successor have faced hurdles.
Washington has said that any new arms control accord would include China. However, China has expressed little enthusiasm for such a move.
Thus, developments in facilities in areas such as Sichuan are closely monitored, not only in terms of their implications for China’s military strategy, but also in terms of their implications for nuclear security worldwide.
