China is not feeling the shock of war in the Middle East – yet.
But it is feeling the ripples.
In the short-term, it has enough oil supplies for several months, after which it could turn to neighbour Russia for help.
But China will be calculating what this could mean long-term – not just for its investments in the Middle East, but also for its ambitions.
This week, thousands of Communist Party delegates are meeting in Beijing to discuss a roadmap for the world’s second-largest economy as it continues to battle low consumption, a prolonged property crisis and huge local debt.
On Thursday, China lowered its annual economic growth target to the lowest level since 1991, even as Beijing continues its rapid development of high-tech and renewables industries.
China may have hoped to export its way out of economic trouble. But it has spent a year fighting a trade war with the United States, and now faces the prospect of upheaval in the Middle East, which supplies both its major shipping routes and a lot of its energy needs.
The longer the war drags on, the more it could hurt, especially if traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remains blocked.
“A prolonged period of turmoil and insecurity in the Middle East will disrupt other regions of importance for China,” says Philip Shetler-Jones from the Royal United Services Institute.
“African economies, for instance, have been the beneficiary of substantial and steady flows of Gulf capital. If the investment tide goes out, this risks wider instability that undermines the sustainability of China’s broader and longer-term interests.”
That is, given China’s global footprint, its investments and markets beyond the Middle East are also vulnerable to a protracted war. And like so many other countries, China too is wary of this fresh bout of unpredictability.
“I think China is thinking the same as everyone else,” says Professor Kerry Brown, director of the China Lau Institute at King’s College London.
“What is the game plan? Surely the Americans didn’t go into this with no game plan.”
But then, he adds: “Probably, along with everyone else, they would also be thinking, oh God, they really have gone into this with no plan at all. Right, we don’t want to get dragged into this like we don’t want to get dragged into anything else, but we also need to do something.”
Not-so-firm friends
Iran was always designated as an “ally” of China by many in the West.
They have certainly been very friendly. The last foreign trip taken by Tehran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was to Beijing in 1989. He had his photograph taken by the Great Wall.
The partnership between them deepened when Xi Jinping visited Tehran in 2016 and the two countries eventually signed a 25-year strategic partnership in 2021.
China promised to invest $400bn (£300bn) in Iran over 25 years and, in exchange, Iran would keep the oil flowing.
However, analysts believe only a fraction of that money has reached the Iranians. But the oil kept flowing.
China imported 1.38 million barrels of crude per day from Iran in 2025, according to the Center on Global Energy Policy – around 12% of China’s total crude oil imports. Many of these barrels are alleged to have been relabelled as Malaysian to disguise their origin.
The research centre at Columbia University released a report claiming there are more than 46 million barrels of Iranian oil in floating storage in Asia, and even more in bonded storage, which is yet to be cleared by customs, in the Chinese ports of Dalian and Zhoushan, where the National Iranian Oil Company leases tanks.
There have also been allegations of arms sales between the two countries. China has denied selling Tehran anti-ship cruise missiles, but US intelligence has accused Beijing of supporting Iran’s ballistic missile programme by training engineers and supplying components.
Rights groups have alleged that Iran’s brutal crackdowns against protesters and critics of the regime has been fuelled by Chinese facial recognition and surveillance tech, shared by Beijing.
It may sound like the two were firm friends.
All of this even prompted tabloid headlines lumping China and Iran together as an “axis of upheaval” alongside North Korea and Russia. All four do want to challenge the US-led world order, but in truth their relationship was transactional.
“There’s no real ideological or cultural reason why China would get on with Iran,” Prof Brown says.
“China’s almost ‘divide and rule’ strategy was sometimes well-served by Iran being a constant irritant to the US. So I think there are largely negative reasons for China wanting a relationship with Iran, rather than positive reasons.
“That’s a really fragile basis for a relationship, and it worked – up to a point. But it wasn’t a very deep relationship.”
China does not view its “alliances” in the same way the West does. It does not sign mutual defence treaties and will not come rushing to its ally’s aid.
Instead, Beijing is keen to stay out of any conflict.
Leading the charge
But that does not mean China isn’t deeply troubled by what is happening in the Middle East.
Beijing issued a predictable and muted condemnation and called for a ceasefire.
Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said it was “unacceptable for the US and Israel to launch attacks against Iran… still less to blatantly assassinate a leader of a sovereign country and instigate regime change”.
The truth is Washington’s actions in Venezuela in January, and now in Iran, have highlighted the limits of those countries’ partnerships with China.
On both occasions, Beijing has been left on the sidelines as an observer, incapable of helping those within its orbit.
China is trying to position itself as a “responsible counter-balance” to the US, says Philip Shetler-Jones from the Royal United Services Institute, but “in terms of military balance, the US is demonstrating what being a superpower really means, which is the ability to force outcomes in theatres across the globe”.
Beijing, he argues, is not “a superpower on the same level” despite its economic might. “It is not equipped to protect its friends against this kind of action, even if it wanted to.”
To counter these concerns, Xi will continue positioning himself as a stable and predictable global leader, in contrast to Donald Trump.
“China’s argument will be that Donald Trump has once again demonstrated beyond any doubt the extent of western hypocrisy and western talk of the liberal international order,” says Professor Steve Tsang, director of the SOAS China institute.
Disruptions to energy supply and air travel as a result of this conflict will “have far greater ramifications economically in the Global South than in the West”, he adds.
“Some countries are going to have food shortage in a few months… and those are Global South countries. We’re also already seeing the rupturing of the Western alliance, with the UK, Spain, being singled out for attack.”
Beijing may also see a chance to help mediate talks along with other countries. Foreign Minister Wang Yi has already spoken to his counterparts in Oman and France, and China has announced it will send a special envoy to the Middle East.
Trump’s looming visit
Still, China is treading carefully because one of the biggest calculations for them is the mercurial US president, who is due to arrive for a much-awaited meeting later this month.
None of China’s criticisms of US and Israeli strikes on Iran have targeted Trump directly, which may make a handshake a little easier.
Some have speculated if the visit can still go ahead. But there are signs it is still on. Officials from both sides are due to meet to discuss the trip, Reuters reports.
China may see this as a chance to “look for cues”, says Shetler-Jones, on how Trump may respond to other flashpoints like Taiwan, the self-governed island it claims.
“To the extent this war proves unpopular, it might contribute to a growing trend of ‘restraint’ in US foreign and security policy that – if put into effect by a future administration – give China a freer hand to pursue its interests in its own region and the wider world.”
This crisis presents some in China with an opportunity to paint Washington as warmongers, which the People’s Liberation Army has done across social media.
But having such “an unpredictable and a dysfunctional actor” may be a source of unease for Beijing, Prof Brown says.
“I don’t think China wants a world that’s dominated by the US, but they don’t really want a world where the US is such an unstable actor.”
