With the activation of the Mecca pact, Saudi Arabia now has the military support of Pakistan and Turkey by its side. But can the combined force defeat the Houthis? Years of Saudi-led warfare and US-British strikes suggest otherwise. Here’s what experts say victory in Yemen would actually mean.

Eleven years ago in 2015, Saudi Arabia asked Pakistan for warplanes, naval ships and ground troops for its war against the Houthis in Yemen. The request triggered five days of debate in Pakistan’s Parliament. Opposition parties warned against putting Pakistani boots on Yemeni soil and getting sucked into a regional war. On April 10, 2015, the Pakistani Parliament unanimously chose neutrality, even while promising to stand “shoulder to shoulder” with Saudi Arabia if its territorial integrity or the holy sites of Makkah and Madinah were threatened. Since then, the equation has changed. It’s Field Marshal Asim Munir’s Pakistan now. And, Riyadh isn’t asking. It’s demanding assistance. Pakistan, bound by the Mecca defence pact, is preparing to play the mercenary again.

Under the Mecca defence pact, an attack on Saudi Arabia triggers the collective-defence obligations of Pakistan and Turkey. With Houthi attacks testing Saudi defences, the Mecca pact was activated on Monday. Pakistan and Turkey would deploy forces and military capabilities in the Arabian kingdom. Now the question is, if Riyadh has Pakistan’s fauj by its side, can they actually defeat the Iran-backed Houthis?

Under the three-country pact, an armed attack on one is considered an attack on all. Saudi Arabia has been under attack for weeks. Now, with Houthi drones and missiles reaching the holy cities of Makkah and Madinah, capital Riyadh, its King Khalid International Airport, an Aramco refinery and military sites across Saudi Arabia, the three allies have moved to activate the pact’s commitments.

Saudi Arabia is among the world’s biggest military spenders. It has a flashy military. Pakistan brings a huge and battle-hardened military, which has struggled to tame its homegrown insurgencies and terrorism. Turkey adds Nato’s experience and a formidable defence industry but has little experience fighting a sustained war against an entrenched adversary like the Houthis far from its own borders. Together, can they actually defeat the Houthis?

The short answer depends on what “defeat” means. Pakistan and Turkey could make Saudi Arabia considerably tougher to attack, and the three could inflict heavy damage on the Houthis or help Yemeni forces recover some territory. But, destroying Ansar Allah (as the Houthis are also known), the military and political force, would mean solving a problem that years of Saudi-led warfare and subsequent US and British strikes have failed to solve in Yemen.

The Mecca Joint Defence Agreement was signed in August by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Pakistan PM Shehbaz Sharif and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. All three governments have described it as defensive rather than an instrument for aggression. US President Donald Trump welcomed the agreement, saying he was “very happy” to see the three countries coming together and becoming better able to defend themselves, something he wanted.

PAKISTAN CAN HELP DEFEND SAUDI, BUT CAN IT DEFEAT HOUTHIS?

On paper, the disparity is huge. On one side, you’ve the flip-flop-wearing Houthi fighters, wielding Kalashnikovs and riding Toyota Hilux. On the other side are the professional militaries of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey, equipped with fighter jets, missiles, drones and some of the world’s most sophisticated weapons.

Saudi Arabia spent about $80 billion on its military in 2025. Pakistan adds experienced land and air forces, while Turkey has Nato’s second-largest military and a sophisticated drone, missile and electronic-warfare industry.

But according to Pakistani security analyst Ejaz Haider, the apparent asymmetry in conventional strength exactly makes a war in Yemen deceptive. Writing in Karachi-based newspaper, The Friday Times, Haider examined four options. A ground offensive, stand-off air and missile strikes, a combination of air defence and long-range attacks, and a naval blockade. None, he concluded, can offer a clear route to defeating the Houthis.

Northern Yemen’s mountains and ravines favour defenders, the Houthis. They also have the caves, underground facilities, mobile missile launchers and decentralised command structures. Sending a mechanised army into such terrain would also create vulnerable supply lines carrying fuel, ammunition, food and water.

“Airpower can be useful but only in a limited way. It cannot win the war,” Haider wrote.

Saudi Arabia has already tested that proposition. Its coalition began an intensive air campaign in Yemen in 2015. The Houthis survived, grew in strength, advanced and gained more territories. More recently, the US and British forces also bombed Houthi positions. But they couldn’t eliminate their ability to launch missiles and drones.

“…The only way out for Riyadh is to talk to Ansar Allah,” Haider wrote. Pakistan, he argued, should help produce a diplomatic settlement rather than get “sucked into an ill-conceived Saudi war”.

PAKISTAN COULDN’T EVEN FINISH TTP: EXPERT

Pakistani security commentator Farhan Jaffrey, after the Mecca pact was signed in October, took to X and compared Pakistan’s overseas pursuits with its own experience of dealing with insurgency, which Islamabad calls terrorism.

“Pakistan has been fighting the TTP for about two decades now but still hasn’t been able to defeat them on its own turf. So don’t expect, even theoretically, that Pakistan can defeat the Houthis in Yemen,” he wrote on X in October.

The comparison might not be an exact one, but it does point to something. The TTP and Houthis are very different groups operating in different terrain and political and geopolitical environments. But Jaffrey’s larger point is that a stronger military can struggle to defeat an entrenched armed group.

Middle East and intelligence analyst Danny Citrinowicz made a similar argument about the Saudi experience in Yemen.

“The idea that Saudi Arabia can simply bomb the Houthis into submission ignores one of the clearest lessons of the Yemen war: Riyadh has already tried that. It didn’t work,” he wrote on X. “Military superiority alone does not guarantee strategic success,” he added.

DON’T CONQUER YEMEN, WIN A LIMITED WAR

Pakistan-focussed strategic commentator Abdul Munim, writing on Substack, suggested a less pessimistic alternative.

His argument isn’t that Saudi Arabia and Pakistan can march on Sanaa and destroy the Houthis. Instead, he proposed narrowly defined military objectives, principally restoring Yemeni government control along the Red Sea coast and Bab al-Mandab before stopping and negotiating.

“The ground war belongs to the Yemeni government forces,” he argued, while “Pakistan’s role is to hold the Kingdom itself.”

Munim argued Pakistan could strengthen Saudi air defence, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, freeing Saudi assets to support Yemeni government forces. But he explicitly argued against advancing into Sanaa, Saada or Yemen’s northern highlands.

History also offers a lesson. Egypt committed tens of thousands of troops to North Yemen in the 1960s and became bogged down in a costly mountain war. Saudi Arabia’s own intervention after 2015 produced years of fighting without dislodging the Houthis. The UAE, which backed some separatists seeking an independent South Yemen, has already withdrawn.

Also, the Houthis are not any other militia which can simply be bombed out of existence. They are using Claude to learn missile technology and are cloning voices using AI to deceive the enemy.

More importantly, they control Sanaa and much of northern and western Yemen, including territory where an estimated 60–65% of Yemenis live, and has grown from a Zaydi revivalist movement into a deeply entrenched political and military force. A UN panel estimated its fighting strength at around 350,000, while years of Iranian and Hezbollah assistance have helped turn it into an organised force armed with capable missiles and drones. It has a combination of territory, fighters, ideology and local roots that helps explain why the Houthis have survived.

So, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey might possess enough conventional power to punish the Houthis, strengthen Riyadh’s defences and perhaps reverse specific territorial gains of the Iranian proxies. But conquering Yemen’s northern highlands and eliminating the Houthis is another matter.

In 2015, Pakistan’s Parliament decided that it was a war it should not enter. Eleven years later, Asim Munir’s Pakistan is more tightly bound to Saudi’s defence. Pakistan’s commitment to protect the kingdom might have changed. What hasn’t changed is the Houthi’s ability to turn a powerful foreign army’s promise of victory into a never-ending war.