The law legally consolidates President Xi Jinping’s constant efforts to establish a national identity and promote the idea of a single “Chinese nation”.
New Delhi: The new Chinese Ethnic Unity and Progress Law is not only directed against those living inside Chinese borders but, according to human rights defenders, also tries to stretch Beijing’s control over the overseas Uyghur, Tibetan and Mongolian communities. This is yet another escalation of China’s attempts to suppress its critics beyond the border.
China’s National People’s Congress passed the law on March 12. It legally consolidates President Xi Jinping’s constant efforts to establish a national identity and promote the idea of a single “Chinese nation”. The law encourages Mandarin to be spoken as the common language and stresses the integration of the country’s 56 officially recognised ethnic groups into the Chinese identity.
However, several provisions in the new law have alarmed observers.
For decades, the authorities of different countries and human rights organisations have accused Beijing of persecuting its critics living outside China. Uyghur, Tibetan, and Hong Kong activists residing in the United States, Germany, Australia and India have complained about intimidation, online surveillance, pressure on their families staying in China, and efforts to influence or spy on them via networks loyal to the Chinese state.
The new law appears to provide a legal framework for these actions.
According to the new regulation, Beijing is able to hold accountable foreign organisations and individuals for actions “that undermine ethnic unity and progress or create ethnic division.”
Many human rights defenders consider the wording of the provision so vague that it may be used for persecuting peaceful advocacy, journalism, academic research, or criticism of Chinese policy by individuals who reside entirely outside China.
Human Rights Watch called the provision an example of China’s increasing usage of transnational repression – a policy of intimidation and silencing of critics outside Chinese territory.
On the other hand, Beijing has justified its actions through economic development and improvement of the living standards in the regions where ethnic minorities live. In the eyes of the Chinese officials, the outside critics distort reality, ignoring all these achievements.
Critics, however, do not believe in this justification.
According to them, economic development, regardless of its scope, does not justify the claim of legal authority of the people living in other countries. Neither does it solve the problem with surveillance systems, restrictions on cultural and religious freedom, and other policies that drove many representatives of these communities out of China.
The law will add fuel to the diplomatic conflicts between Beijing and governments that already accuse it of interference in their domestic matters. Several states have been investigating “overseas police service stations” that work on behalf of China, protecting their diasporas and protesting against Chinese interference in their affairs.
The fact that Beijing has now legally entrenched these powers increases the risk of new tensions stemming from its claims to exercise influence beyond its borders.
Expat organisations are reacting to the situation as well. A coalition of Uyghur, Tibetan, Southern Mongolian and Hong Kong organisations has asked European lawmakers to condemn the legislation, fearing that it would legitimise persecution of communities residing overseas.
For many Uyghurs, Tibetans and Mongolians who left China trying to express themselves without fear of state retribution, this new law brings quite a discouraging message: being far from China does not protect them anymore from Beijing’s attempts to suppress dissent.
